Category: News

Over the past decade, China has deployed a diplomatic strategy toward the Pacific Island Countries (PICs). This strategy pursues two main objectives: countering Taiwan’s diplomatic influence in the region and countering the influence of liberal democracies in what Beijing refers to as the “Global South.”

Initially, Beijing adopted a cautious and discreet approach, but it shifted to a more assertive stance from 2021 onward, with varying degrees of success.

A central driver of China’s strategy is reducing Taiwan’s diplomatic presence. Beijing has successfully persuaded countries such as the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, and Nauru to switch recognition from Taipei, while pressuring PICs to limit Taiwan’s participation in regional fora. Nonetheless, resistance persists, and upcoming Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) leadership may reopen space for Taiwan.

China has also increased its military footprint through naval deployments, port calls, and security cooperation. However, the region’s logistical constraints and strong ties with Australia limit Beijing’s defense influence. Public security agreements—especially with the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu—raise concerns about political interference.

Despite China’s growing aid and presence, Australia remains the dominant development and security partner.

Stay tuned with us by reading more: ReConnect China Policy Brief 31-Countering Taiwan and Western Influence

Over the past few years, China has emerged as a key player in the global arena of environmental protection. China is simultaneously the most polluting country (though not in per capita emissions) and the country that invests the most in renewable energy. Since 2007, environmental protection policies in China are framed under the umbrella term of “ecological civilisation”.

This policy brief analyses the key values (i.e. beliefs and worldviews) driving the construction of an “ecological civilisation”. It highlights that the values driving China’s authorities are better understood in terms of “green growth”. This is because it does not entail a paradigmatic transformation of China’s current development path but attaches a prominent role to green technologies as China’s new growth engine.

Two main motivations are behind the adoption of “ecological civilisation” by China’s authorities: first, for China’s foreign policy, the “ecological civilisation” aspire to become an alternative model that compete with the Western one. Second, the domestic promotion of “ecological civilisation” by Beijing has gradually reduced the space for bottom-up actions, motivated by the belief that only a top-down approach to behavioural control is efficient. Under Xi Jinping, the “ecological civilisation” has even assumed personalised-politics features, in its becoming “Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilisation”, so it is even more driven by the view that only a strict top-down control can practically solve environmental problems.

This has practical and conceptual implications for the European Union (EU). At the practical level, while continuing the cooperation with China in the environmental field, the EU should pay attention to avoid supporting narratives (and sub-narratives) that celebrate the Chinese political approach to the environment. At the same time, the concept of ecological civilisation represents a conceptual challenge for the EU. This should lead to elaborating EU’s own narratives and imagination for a global future,  and also reconsidering the key drivers of our approach to safeguard ourselves and the rest of the Earth.

Policy recommendations:

Stay tuned with us by reading more: ReConnect China Policy Brief 30-Ecological civilisation

Executive summary:

The withdrawal of the United States (U.S.) from the Paris Agreement has destabilised global climate governance. This generates growing pressure on the European Union (EU) and China to assume greater responsibility for driving international climate action. Under the Paris Agreement, both remain committed to further reduce their greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions. Yet, diverging domestic priorities, rising trade competition, and growing geo-economic tensions risk undermining their ability to cooperate effectively.

At the heart of this challenge lies a key dimension of global climate policy that remains largely neglected: non-CO₂ GHGs and short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs), such as methane and black carbon (BC). Those pollutants are responsible for nearly half of observed global warming and cause severe health damage, yet they remain largely absent from the EU–China climate dialogue and technical cooperation. Their reduction represents one of the most effective near-term strategies to curb warming and deliver immediate health co-benefits.

This brief argues that the EU should recalibrate its climate diplomacy with China by embedding the climate–air quality nexus into its strategic approach. Doing so would strengthen Europe’s credibility as a global climate leader, leverage China’s domestic experience with air pollution control, and fill the geopolitical vacuum left by U.S. retrenchment.

Policy recommendations:

Stay tuned with us by reading more: ReConnect China Policy Brief 29-Rethinking EU–China Climate Diplomacy

China’s Belt and Road Initiative has improved infrastructure connections with the country’s neighbours and so strengthened the gravitational pull of its economy. Chinese projects in Central Asia – in particular its railway and pipeline projects – have led to rapid increase in cargo across the China-Europe Railway Express (CRE) and energy movement between China and Central Asia.

CRE traffic from China to Europe and energy flows from Central Asia to Europe were hit by the fall-out of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. This has increased Chinese and Central Asian interests in routes that avoid Russia, the so-called Middle Corridor. Yet risks remain that increased Eurasian connectivity would still help supplies reach Russia or increase Chinese invulnerability to maritime sanctions.

The BRI’s success stems from structural forces that cannot be stopped. The best EU response would not be to attempt preventing countries to work with China, but to direct its energy to improve Europe’s gravitational trade pull with complementary infrastructure projects. Worries about the strategic impact of the BRI programme should not stand in the way of tactical cooperation when in Europe’s interests. Synergy between the EU’s Global Gateway (GG) and China’s BRI can help make up for shortfalls in funding and political momentum on Europe’s side. Chinese and Central Asian interests behind improving Middle Corridor railway and pipeline connections can be made to work for EU interests.

Tactical synergy with China’s BRI can safely improve EU-China connectivity:

Stay tuned with us by reading more: ReConnect China Policy Brief 28-Middling corridor risks