Policy briefs

Over the past few years, China has emerged as a key player in the global arena of environmental protection. China is simultaneously the most polluting country (though not in per capita emissions) and the country that invests the most in renewable energy. Since 2007, environmental protection policies in China are framed under the umbrella term of “ecological civilisation”.

This policy brief analyses the key values (i.e. beliefs and worldviews) driving the construction of an “ecological civilisation”. It highlights that the values driving China’s authorities are better understood in terms of “green growth”. This is because it does not entail a paradigmatic transformation of China’s current development path but attaches a prominent role to green technologies as China’s new growth engine.

Two main motivations are behind the adoption of “ecological civilisation” by China’s authorities: first, for China’s foreign policy, the “ecological civilisation” aspire to become an alternative model that compete with the Western one. Second, the domestic promotion of “ecological civilisation” by Beijing has gradually reduced the space for bottom-up actions, motivated by the belief that only a top-down approach to behavioural control is efficient. Under Xi Jinping, the “ecological civilisation” has even assumed personalised-politics features, in its becoming “Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilisation”, so it is even more driven by the view that only a strict top-down control can practically solve environmental problems.

This has practical and conceptual implications for the European Union (EU). At the practical level, while continuing the cooperation with China in the environmental field, the EU should pay attention to avoid supporting narratives (and sub-narratives) that celebrate the Chinese political approach to the environment. At the same time, the concept of ecological civilisation represents a conceptual challenge for the EU. This should lead to elaborating EU’s own narratives and imagination for a global future,  and also reconsidering the key drivers of our approach to safeguard ourselves and the rest of the Earth.

Policy recommendations:

Stay tuned with us by reading more: ReConnect China Policy Brief 30-Ecological civilisation

Executive summary:

The withdrawal of the United States (U.S.) from the Paris Agreement has destabilised global climate governance. This generates growing pressure on the European Union (EU) and China to assume greater responsibility for driving international climate action. Under the Paris Agreement, both remain committed to further reduce their greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions. Yet, diverging domestic priorities, rising trade competition, and growing geo-economic tensions risk undermining their ability to cooperate effectively.

At the heart of this challenge lies a key dimension of global climate policy that remains largely neglected: non-CO₂ GHGs and short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs), such as methane and black carbon (BC). Those pollutants are responsible for nearly half of observed global warming and cause severe health damage, yet they remain largely absent from the EU–China climate dialogue and technical cooperation. Their reduction represents one of the most effective near-term strategies to curb warming and deliver immediate health co-benefits.

This brief argues that the EU should recalibrate its climate diplomacy with China by embedding the climate–air quality nexus into its strategic approach. Doing so would strengthen Europe’s credibility as a global climate leader, leverage China’s domestic experience with air pollution control, and fill the geopolitical vacuum left by U.S. retrenchment.

Policy recommendations:

Stay tuned with us by reading more: ReConnect China Policy Brief 29-Rethinking EU–China Climate Diplomacy

China’s Belt and Road Initiative has improved infrastructure connections with the country’s neighbours and so strengthened the gravitational pull of its economy. Chinese projects in Central Asia – in particular its railway and pipeline projects – have led to rapid increase in cargo across the China-Europe Railway Express (CRE) and energy movement between China and Central Asia.

CRE traffic from China to Europe and energy flows from Central Asia to Europe were hit by the fall-out of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. This has increased Chinese and Central Asian interests in routes that avoid Russia, the so-called Middle Corridor. Yet risks remain that increased Eurasian connectivity would still help supplies reach Russia or increase Chinese invulnerability to maritime sanctions.

The BRI’s success stems from structural forces that cannot be stopped. The best EU response would not be to attempt preventing countries to work with China, but to direct its energy to improve Europe’s gravitational trade pull with complementary infrastructure projects. Worries about the strategic impact of the BRI programme should not stand in the way of tactical cooperation when in Europe’s interests. Synergy between the EU’s Global Gateway (GG) and China’s BRI can help make up for shortfalls in funding and political momentum on Europe’s side. Chinese and Central Asian interests behind improving Middle Corridor railway and pipeline connections can be made to work for EU interests.

Tactical synergy with China’s BRI can safely improve EU-China connectivity:

Stay tuned with us by reading more: ReConnect China Policy Brief 28-Middling corridor risks

Executive summary:

The European Union (EU) confronts a profound and escalating challenge to its democratic and information integrity from Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), particularly emanating from China. Since around 2020, China’s FIMI activities in Europe have grown in scale and sophistication, moving beyond traditional propaganda tools by blending digital tactics with economic coercion to influence public opinion and policy. These activities use coordinated social media operations, covert online networks, and state-controlled media partnerships to amplify pro-Beijing narratives and suppress criticism, often backed by threats of economic coercion.

The EU’s current response, a patchwork of regulatory measures and voluntary platforms (e.g. the Digital Services Act and the Code of Practice on Disinformation), remains fragmented across institutions and too reactive to emerging threats. This inconsistent framework leaves Europe vulnerable to coordinated influence operations that can erode trust in democratic institutions and processes.

This brief argues the imperative for the EU is clear: it must transition from a collection of disparate initiatives to a whole-of-EU integrated, proactive and dynamic policy framework that treats FIMI as a critical security challenge by linking information security with economic security to bolster enforcement of tools to counter China’s FIMI. This integration is necessary because the synergistic combination of FIMI and economic coercion creates a ‘grey zone’ threat, which exploits the seams between current regulatory silos. A coordinated, hybrid response is essential to pre-emptively disrupt these cross-domain attacks.

Policy recommendations:

Stay tuned with us by reading more: ReConnect China Policy Brief 27-From Fragmentation to Integration

During the 2010s, China became one of the leading connectivity players in Africa – if not the most important one. This policy brief focuses on a key aspect of China’s approach towards African continent – the provision of loans linked to construction of physical infrastructure. We argue that the importance of these projects may have come close to rivalling the importance of trade in the China-Africa relationship – but its future role is questionable due to unsustainable debts.

The start of the upsurge of Chinese loans and construction projects in Africa predated the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), though the BRI further increased the money flow, leading to a peak in new Chinese loans between 2013-2018. However, the amount of the loans began to ebb before the end of the decade. Subsequently, the COVID pandemic and other factors led to a significant decrease of new projects.

While BRI is by no means dead, its visibility is now reduced, as new initiatives are introduced. China’s connectivity presence in Africa now emphasises “small and beautiful” projects, often with a focus on green and digital infrastructure, involving a variety of actors, financiers, and models such as public-private partnerships (PPPs).

Recommendations for the EU:

Stay tuned with us by reading more: ReConnect China Policy Brief 26-African infrastructure

Executive summary:

Political changes in West Africa in recent years have led to a sudden end of French military presence. It is not just Russia that has expanded its clout. Beijing engages closely with the new juntas in West Africa. This includes a role for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

To understand the PLA’s role, we need to understand its background as a party army. Direct control by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) means the PLA is tasked with implementing the Party’s broader conceptualisation of the military sphere. This serves a distinct vision of international security embodied by the Global Security Initiative (GSI). Under this umbrella, Beijing offers much-welcome cooperation on internal security the European Union (EU) can study.

In practical military terms, PLA presence in West Africa is limited. There are some port visits, joint exercises, and concerns about security in the Gulf of Guinea. China has, however, overtaken Russia as Africa’s biggest weapons supplier. Beijing is now expanding sales in West African countries as France is on the retreat. In this arena it is hard for the EU to compete, because of local perceptions of an overbearing Europe and EU objections based on its own interests and values.

Beijing’s active military diplomacy and publicity efforts showcase China’s story in the region. Concrete contributions and personal attention are well-received. Through professional military education (PME) and a variety of diplomatic platforms, Chinese values can have durable influence on conceptualisation of security. Europe is not equally effective in selling its offering.

China’s growing heft in West Africa has implications for nearby Europe. The EU’s response needs to face both its public perception in the region as well as the unique facets of the PRC’s military. Only in this way can the EU ensure European interests.

Moving forward, the EU should:

Stay tuned with us by reading more: ReConnectChina Policy Brief 25-West Africa

Executive summary:

This policy brief critically examines the concept of “New Quality Productive Forces According to Local Conditions” (NPF) which aims to optimise resource allocation and foster technological advancement, thereby positioning China as a global leader in innovation. This approach seeks to address inefficiencies resulting from the neglect of local advantages and to channel innovation resources into strategic growth clusters.

The NPF approach is based on China’s longstanding division into three economic macro-regions, assigning coastal provinces the task of spearheading technological innovations, while central and western regions play supportive roles. Yet, in a novel move, the NPF introduces new mechanisms of “differentiated development paths” and “classified guidance” to enhance the redistribution of national resources toward high-quality development. Existing innovation hubs will acquire more resources and support, but in less developed inland areas, new manufacturing hubs can be expected to emerge.

A case study of Chengdu illustrates how the city has leveraged its local characteristics and advantages to align with the NPF approach. Chengdu’s plans emphasise agriculture, science, and technology, with a particular focus on cutting-edge fields such as artificial intelligence and microchips. These efforts are underpinned by substantial infrastructure projects and a competitive environment for future industries.

Overall, the NPF strategy’s emphasis on local conditions appears as a more resource-efficient and pragmatic alternative to previous plans. However, challenges persist, including regional inequalities and persistent bottlenecks in policy implementation. The ultimate success of this strategy will depend on its detailed execution in the forthcoming 15^th Five-Year Plan.

Policy recommendations:

Stay tuned with us by reading more: ReConnect China Policy Brief 24-Local conditions

Executive summary:

At the opening of the ‘Summit of the Future Action Days,’ held in New York on 20 and 21 September 2024, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres stated the following: “Four years ago […] we saw our multilateral institutions ailing—unable to respond to contemporary challenges, let alone those of tomorrow. We saw faith in multilateral solutions eroding. And we saw trust in each other dissipating just when we needed it most. So, we began a journey to reform to renew the international system so that it meets the moment and is fit for the future. We need multilateralism that is more inclusive, more effective and more networked—with stronger links between international institutions and with the people. That means greater representation of developing countries. And it means a stronger voice for all of you and what you represent”.1 This call reflects the realization that the world’s economic balance is shifting towards the Global South and that, concomitant with this development, the countries of the Global South aspire a greater say in the existing institutions of global governance. This Policy Brief addresses the question of the ‘universality of values’ such a change raises, hereby focusing on the alternative strategic narratives of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the second-largest global economy in nominal terms.

Policy recommendations:

Stay tuned with us by reading more: Reconnect China Policy Brief 23-Drinking Xi Wine

Whether or not the People’s Republic of China (PRC) engages in divide-and-rule diplomacy vis-à-vis the EU can be investigated empirically. Based on unique databases of Beijing’s diplomatic engagement created by the author, and secondary literature, this policy brief describes what Chinese state and political level engagement with Europe actually looks like – and what lessons can be drawn from that for EU foreign policy on China.

The paper first discusses two tools of China’s foreign affairs work that owe their unique features to the Chinese party-state: Chinese ‘new type of great power relations’ and the use of ‘friendship’. Second, the paper looks at empirical data on state-to-state interactions that makes clear the friends and great power counterparts in Europe. Third, the paper discusses Beijing’s party diplomacy targeting European elites and finds different permutations of the same groupings.

The brief concludes with a consideration of possibilities for the EU to deal with Beijing’s diplomacy among member states as it really exists. It takes two hands to clap: compatibility with member states’ own foreign policy decisions is vital.  The issue is not so much the quantity of interactions with China as it is the quality.

Policy recommendations:

Stay tuned with us by reading more: ReConnect China Policy Brief 22-Responding with data

The establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2016, on a Chinese initiative, constituted an attempt to bridge the gap in infrastructure financing in Asia. However, it was also perceived in the West as a potential vehicle for China’s geostrategic agendas, fueling the suspicion that the institution might compete rather than align with existing multilateral development banks (MDBs) and impose its own standards.

After almost a decade of existence, the AIIB seems to have proven such critics wrong. It has managed to establish its credentials, has cooperated with other MDBs as well as with national development assistance agencies and aligned with their standards and operating practices. The bank has also expanded its scope of activities both geographically and in terms of sectors. Going beyond infrastructure financing, the AIIB has established a special facility to help developing countries recover after the Covid-19 pandemic.

Despite these positive achievements, several of the initial concerns have not been fully placated, and some signs point to possible dangers in the years to come.

While the AIIB could not be shown to be the main financing instrument of President Xi’s flagship project (Belt and Road Initiative – BRI), the conditions may now be in place for China to turn the institution into a geopolitical tool.

Although there is no evidence so far of Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) interference in the internal governance of the bank, the concentration of power in the hands of the bank’s President (at the expense of the board of directors) is a source of concern. Moreover, the increasingly heavy-handed assertive China should not be taken lightly and calls for utmost caution on the part of the bank’s members.

Lastly, the AIIB’s performance in terms of environmental and social standards calls for tighter oversight.

Stay tuned with us by reading more: ReConnect China Policy Brief 21-The China-led AIIB

Executive summary:

China and Russia maintain a strategic partnership rooted in shared opposition to the U.S. and liberal democracies, but their relationship is shaped more by pragmatism than trust. While Putin and Xi declared a “friendship without limits” before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, China has since avoided repeating the phrase. Their cooperation remains strong, yet historical tensions, diverging priorities, and mutual distrust prevent a formal alliance.

China’s claims of neutrality in the Ukraine war are undermined by its economic and political support for Russia, its selective criticism of Western military aid, and its silence on North Korea’s involvement. Beijing promotes peace rhetoric but does not offer any concrete proposal and provides negligeable humanitarian assistance. Meanwhile, the 2024 North Korea–Russia alliance creates additional challenges, as it contradicts China’s stated positions and risks further destabilizing East Asia, strengthening regional US alliances.

For Europe, expecting China to mediate or distance itself from Russia is unrealistic. Despite significant EU-China trade, Beijing has shown no inclination to influence Putin.

Stay tuned with us by reading more: Reconnect China Policy Brief 20-China-Russia Partnership

Executive summary:

As the intensification of geopolitical competition points toward increased global fragmentation, the definition of technical standards for future markets and industries will play an important role in determining just how deep the fissures will run. China has been a proactive contributor to the development of global standards via established international forums for more than a decade. Its participation has not been without friction, but nevertheless helps to ensure a meaningful level of technological and market convergence across the global economy.

Running in parallel to its engagement in global standards forums, China has multiplied its pathways of engagement in the field through bilateral and regional standards cooperation and “mutual recognition” agreements. Today, Beijing has concluded 108 such agreements with 65 national, regional and other institutional partners. Such developments have raised concerns about the potential for fragmentation of regional standards and the development of economic spheres of influence organized around competing technical standards regimes. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) serves as a framework for concluding many of these agreements, but ultimately has little value as a platform for cooperation in and of itself. So far, on standardisation, the BRI is rather a patchwork of distinct bilateral, regional, and often sector-specific collaboration efforts between China and a diverse range of partners. Yet, as Beijing angles to present alternative pathways for global development, seeking to position itself as the voice of the Global South, outreach and technical assistance in areas such as standardisation have an important diplomatic role to play.

Yet the de-facto pathway to an internationalization of Chinese standards ultimately runs through concrete investments, wherein the “soft” connectivity of standards accompanies the “hard” connectivity of infrastructure and technology. Herein, Chinese firms play a vital role in carrying Chinese standards overseas, and while companies are increasingly central in defining China’s own national standards, they also have a keen interest in ensuring that their standards are compatible with global partners and competitors alike.

Stay tuned with us by reading more: Reconnect China Policy Brief 19-Technical Standardization and BRI

Executive summary:

The EU and its member states are gradually clarifying what the concept of derisking means for its economic relationship with China. Derisking is a useful concept to frame EU-China relations since there are risks in close ties to a powerful external actor with a state-led economy. However, in the current debate surrounding China, derisking could easily translate into an overly broad rejection of economic interactions with this country. We urge the EU to be pragmatic and realistic in determining where to derisk economic ties to China which in our view includes considering at which point risks have been sufficiently covered, and which interactions do not carry political or geopolitical risks. The EU should consider which kinds of trade and investment between the two sides should be limited for geopolitical reasons, but also which can be left open to corporate actors and even which ones are still worth actively supporting.

Stay tuned with us by reading more: ReConnect China policy brief 18-Thoughts on derisking in EU-China Policy Brief

Executive summary:

Over the past years, China has propelled itself as the world’s biggest car manufacturer and exporter, overtaking Germany and Japan. Most notably, China has become the world leader in electric vehicles (EVs). In response to this rising EV production and export capacity, several countries have implemented tariffs on Chinese EVs in an attempt to localise manufacturing. The EU has also imposed tariffs on Chinese EVs despite internal and external opposition. American and European policymakers have justified this stronger trade stance on the basis of so-called “overcapacity” and the argument that Chinese carmakers are propelled to market dominance due to excessive subsidies. This paper refutes this narrative in the specific case of electric vehicles, arguing that while direct subsidies did play an important role, they are not the singular reason why China’s EVs have become globally competitive. Furthermore, there is currently no overcapacity in EV manufacturing. Rather than purely subsidy-oriented, China’s momentous rise is due to wide-spanning policy measures. This strategy included tariffs, local content requirements, and measures inducing vertical integration within the value chain as well as internal competition between Chinese car manufacturers. Nevertheless, European tariffs on EVs – used in a strategic and considerate manner in combination with increased investments in local value chains – can be a useful policy tool to localise manufacturing and create a level playing field, contributing to European and Chinese competitiveness in EVs alike.

Stay tuned with us by reading more: Reconnect China Policy Brief 17_How China’s EV Dominance is Shaping EU Trade Strategy

Executive summary:

Given the highly disruptive potential of AI, global cooperation on AI safety and governance is imperative, and yet the deeply transformational potential of AI also ensures that a high level of competition and systemic rivalry is likely unavoidable. How can the EU best manage its complex relationship with China in the field of AI so as to ensure a necessary level of cooperation in spite of competition and rivalry?

This Policy Brief offers insights from the field of technical standardization for AI. Technical standards are crucial for defining the parameters of AI systems, from basic reference architectures to security and ethics requirements to the technical functioning of specific applications in a wide diversity of fields including healthcare, education, advanced manufacturing, energy, and agriculture. In their efforts to harness and channel the development of AI, both China and the EU have turned to technical standard setting as a means to mitigate risks and achieve broad political goals.

The EU’s AI Act has placed technical standards at the heart of the AI governance conversation by aiming for the development of European “harmonized standards” around risk criteria that AI systems and products must meet in order to comply with EU regulations. China meanwhile has aimed to establish itself as a global leader in AI standardization and is working to balance two, often competing priorities of ensuring control while facilitating innovation and boosting competitiveness. The EU and China seem to be at odds, and yet, common standards are needed to ensure space at the foundational, technical level for necessary cooperation on AI safety and governance and to avoid a more structural slide into de-coupling.

Stay tuned with us by reading more: Reconnect China Policy Brief 16_AI and Technical Standardization